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Abstract 
This article reflects on the use of macro social theoretical perspectives to explain micro social issues.  It uses social 
housing allocations as a case study of the issues that arise in such explanations.  There has been a number of 
important social theoretical examinations of social housing allocation schemes in recent years, spanning socio-legal 
studies.  In contrast to those other studies, we argue that “cookie-cutter” theory is insufficient because they can 
overlook other positions and counter-factual scenarios.  We draw on a sample of local authority allocation schemes 
to reflect on the increasing category of excluded households which we term “unhouseables” (an expression which is 
commonly used by housing officers) – those households which are excluded from appearing on such schemes because 
of their former housing deviance or some other disqualification.  We offer a set of reflections grounded in our data, 
which focus on sustainability.  Thus, rather than point to particular rationalities or the like, we point to particular 
housing issues as explanatory factors – including the declining stock and financial “competitiveness” of social 
housing management – as well as a rise in punitiveness. 
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Introduction 
Public services in England and Wales are in a state of flux. On 21st July 2015, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, George Osborne, launched a spending review calling for further savings 
amounting to £20bn to be found from Whitehall budgets. Every unprotected government 
department is to begin modeling how they might cut budgets by 25 and 40 per cent by 2020. 
Those savings are in addition to the £12bn of welfare savings already unveiled. Such cuts are 
likely to involve a reinvention in the very manner by which public services are delivered and 
enjoyed. On any assessment, public services are, across the board, entering yet another period of 
significant change and upheaval.  
In this article, housing is the public service on which we focus, and more specifically the 
allocation of “social” housing (but, in truth, we could have selected other public services, from 
highways to prisons). Housing in particular has become a political hot topic, with each political 
party in the run up to the General Election in May pledging to outdo their rivals as to the 
number of houses they would build if elected, and with the Conservatives guaranteeing housing 
association tenants the right to buy their homes. It is now widely acknowledged, quite apart from 
party politicking, that there is an acute housing shortage, both private and social, and that 
previous measures designed to redress this shortage have failed. 
Whilst the crisis within the housing sector is at present highly topical, challenges to the very 
nature of public services and their function are anything but new. Indeed, almost every change in 
government leads to apparently stark claims about the need for fundamental changes to the 
purpose of public services, which have extended beyond a simple question of who is to provide 
them.1  Specifically in the field of social housing, this has been shown to be too simplistic.2  The 
precise purpose or purposes behind social housing have remained largely undefined and unclear 
since its very inception. As Power pithily observed, ‘Councils became landlords without 
commitment, plan or forethought.’3 This fevered context within which social housing operates 
and the contemporary public services ‘cuts agenda’ provides us in this paper with the impetus to 
consider not only how social housing is allocated by local authorities in this testing environment 
but also how social theory might be employed to explain this process. 
                                                          
1 See, for example, P. Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting: Regulation, Responsiveness, Relationality (Oxford: OUP, 
2006); C. Harlow & R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), ch 2. 
2 See, for example, the discussion of purpose in S. Fitzpatrick and H. Pawson, “Welfare safety net or tenure of 
choice? The dilemma facing social housing policy in England”, (2007) 22(2) Housing Studies 163; S. Fitzpatrick and H. 
Pawson, “Ending security of tenure for social renters: Transitioning to ‘ambulance service’ social housing?”, (2014) 
29(5) Housing Studies 597. 
3 A. Power, Property before People: The Management of Twentieth Century Council Housing (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 
66. 
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 As to such theorizing, quite grand theoretical claims have been made. Thus, the Conservative 
Party’s time in office in the 1980s has been described as entailing a shift in the provision of social 
housing from allocation on the basis of ‘housing need’ to being awarded according to who 
‘deserved’ it. That shift was underscored by the Major Government with its ill-fated and ill-
conceived “back to basics” philosophy, embodying a nostalgic appeal to so-called traditional 
values.4  By way of illustration, there was an explicit bias towards favouring married couples over 
cohabitants.5 The allocation of social housing in the New Labour era from 1997 has been 
defined as founded on “advanced liberalism”, a link between a mentality of government and 
ethical self-regulation.6 The introduction of greater ‘choice’ into the system as a means of 
empowering communities during this time was portrayed as a solution to the principal housing 
problems. The Coalition Government’s interventions have been identified with a number of new 
problematics including: whether the purpose of social housing was as a welfare safety net, an 
ambulance service;7 the site of further “class war conservatism”;8 or the culmination of processes 
of the production of “welfare ghettos”.9 The Coalition focused its attention on the need for 
social housing to be governed from within, by and for the local; 10 allocations were interpreted as 
“fundamentally a local” issue.11  Thus, the purpose of social housing was to respond to local 
need and the legislative prescription was, not surprisingly, also therefore local, encapsulated in 
the Localism Act 2011.12 This emphasis on localism and decentralisation continues under the 
current Conservative Government. 
The central argument in this paper is that simple binaries, monochrome applications of social 
theories and perspectives, or even different strands of localism (with its lengthy and contested 
histories) cannot explain social housing allocation processes. In support of this argument, we 
                                                          
4 See, for example, S. Fitzpatrick and M. Stephens, “Homelessness, need and desert in the allocation of council 
housing”, (1999) 14(4) Housing Studies 413. 
5 See Department of the Environment, Allocation of Housing Accommodation and Homelessness (London: DoE, 1996), 
para 29. 
6 D. Cowan and A. Marsh, “From need to choice, welfarism to advanced liberalism: Problematics of social housing 
allocation”, (2005) 25(1) Legal Studies 22. 
7 S. Fitzpatrick and H. Pawson, “Ending security of tenure for social renters: Transitioning to ‘ambulance service’ 
social housing?”, (2014) 29(5) Housing Studies 597. 
8 S. Hodkinson and G. Robbins, “The return of class war conservatism? Housing under the UK Coalition 
government” (2012) 33(1) Critical Social Policy 57. 
9 L. Hancock and G. Mooney, “’Welfare ghettos’ and the ‘broken society’: Territorial stigmatization in the 
contemporary UK”, (2013) 30(1) Housing, theory and Society 46, drawing in particular on L. Wacquant, Urban Outcasts: 
A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 
10 See, for example, C. Bevan, “The Localism Act 2011: The hollow housing law revolution”, (2014) 77(6) Modern 
Law Review 964. 
11 CLG, Local Decisions: A Fairer Future for Social Housing, Consultation (London: CLG, 2010), 1.20. 
12 Localism Act 2011.  For contradictions and contestations in the Act’s understandings of localism, see A. Layard, 
“Law and localism: The case of multiple occupancy housing”, (2012) 32(4) Legal Studies 551.  This was a policy 
which underpinned all the major parties policies at the 2015 election: See C. Wiles, “The housing election?”, Inside 
Housing, 7th May 2015, http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/debate/expert-opinion/the-housing-election/7009632.blog 
(last accessed 2nd June 2015). 
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advance three key findings. First, we draw on our own empirical evidence of a relatively 
neglected backwater to illustrate this point: those households which are excluded from social 
housing waiting lists or which, in the legislative vernacular, are “non-qualifying” households. 
From our survey of 50 Local Authority housing allocation schemes, we identify that each 
authority applies similarly-phrased but subtly distinct allocation qualification criteria.  
Secondly, we build on the identification of this patchwork of qualifying criteria to reject what we 
call ‘cookie-cutter’ theoretical analysis. This leads us to call for the development of data-led social 
theories to explain social housing problems and processes. Our argument is that, although there 
is a temptation to adopt “a kind of cookie-cutter typification or explanation, a tendency to 
identify any program with neo-liberal elements as essentially neo-liberal”,13 the strategies and 
techniques of government are far more complex and contradictory.  No one size fits all, but, to 
continue the metaphor, there are different shapes of cookie-cutter apparently in action 
simultaneously, each with their own explanatory logics.14  As Larner observes, “[t]he emergence 
of new forms of political power does not simply involve the imposition of a new understanding 
on top of the old.  The transformation of a polity involves the complex linking of various 
formats of practice, is ongoingly contested, and the result is not a foregone conclusion.  
Consequently, contemporary forms of rule are inevitably composite, plural and multi-form.”15  
Our point is that part of the problem with the “cookie cutter” approach is that it uses macro 
social theory to explain micro phenomena. The theoretical positions we review are best used on 
a very broad canvass of both time and space - in other words, they are best suited to describing 
large social trends; and it is always possible to dispute their use by drawing on micro data which 
do not “fit”.  We are not seeking to undermine or upset larger social theory but to argue for its 
more appropriate usage.  Where it is used in relation to micro social processes, it can be used in 
an inappropriate way: first, to explain rather than describe, and, second, as an all-purpose starting 
point.  
Our final and third finding, again from our data, is that the identified patchwork of housing 
qualification criteria carries with it the potential for the expansion of a category of households 
                                                          
13 N. Rose, P. O’Malley and M. Valverde, “Governmentality”, (2006) 2 Ann Rev Law Soc Sci 83, 97-8. 
14 Here, our “cookie cutter” analogy breaks down; Carr (personal correspondence) suggests that a jelly mould is 
better, but, whatever analogy is chosen, we must recognise its porousness and its fluid and malleable boundaries.  
Our approach has much in common with the theoretically peripatetic and nuanced appreciations in J. Newman, 
“Landscapes of antagonism: Local governance, neoliberalism and austerity”, (2014) 51(15) Urban Studies 3290. 
15 W. Larner, “Neo-liberalism: Policy, ideology, governmentality”, (2000) 63 Studies in Political Economy 5. 
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which are, in social housing parlance, ‘the unhouseables’. 16 This is not a category where housing 
deviance (a term we explain below) is to be neutralised through expulsion; nor are they 
households which, although now excluded, may be re-affiliated at a later time once they have 
demonstrated their self-governing capacities.17  They are, quite simply, banished by a “savage 
sorting” through an “ultimately elementary extraction”,18 and one that might be said to have its 
basis in the techniques of social science.19 
As we explore, perhaps the most pertinent explanation is not the relatively broad-based grand 
theory, but one of transparent politics against a backdrop of coerced collaboration in which the 
more risky households are quite simply weeded out with no possibility (or, at least, no immediate 
possibility) of redemption. These are not conditionality strategies (which are well-documented 
aspects of social welfare20) through which the poor and supposedly indigent are exhorted to self-
improvement,21 but the punitive, sovereign strategy of having the door slammed in their faces.  
As we seek to explain, by whatever means one describes such strategies – as contradictory, as 
authoritarian liberalism, or naked and punitive sovereignty – they are neither politically nor 
spatially differentiated. 
We begin this paper, however, by outlining the rather tortuous legislative and policy history 
surrounding social housing and, more specifically, by detailing the basis upon which households 
are excluded from such housing and how ‘non-qualifying’ status is determined. 
Social housing exclusions 
The developing law: Rationales 
From the outset, exclusions were part and parcel of the social housing allocations process.22  
Such exclusions were either implicit – the rent that was set was too high for many23 – or 
                                                          
16 This is a phrase which appears time and again across various empirical projects in which one of us has been 
involved.  It refers to a category of household which no public or private agency wants to provide accommodation.  
They are not ready fodder for the private sector, as some of the more antagonistic, class theorists might suggest. 
17 As might be suggested by what Rose describes as “circuits of exclusion”: N. Rose, “Government and control”, 
(2000) 40 British Journal of Criminology 321, 330 et seq. 
18 S. Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge, Mass: 2014), 4 and 15. 
19 There is an overlap between our analysis and the insurantial moral hazard – both have in their sights the immoral 
person and the relationship itself “so as not to ‘lead us into temptation’”: T. Baker, “Insuring morality”, (2000) 29(4) 
Economy and Society 559, 562. 
20 See, for example, M. Dean, “A genealogy of the government of poverty”, (1992) 21(3) Economy & Society 215; W. 
Walters, Unemployment and Government (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
21 As are also current in social housing practices – see J. Flint, “Housing and ethopolitics: Constructing identities of 
active consumption and responsible community”, (2003) 32(4) Economy and Society 611. 
22 “The Ministry of Health provided guidance in 1920 which suggested “the careful selection of tenants” and “the 
elimination of unsatisfactory tenants”, but did not offer any criteria under which such assessments could be made”: 
D. Cowan and M. McDermont, Regulating Social Housing: Governing Decline (London: Routledge Glasshouse, 2006). 
23 M. Bowley, Housing and the State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1945), 129. 
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explicit.24  Early studies, for example, demonstrated how applicants were “graded” according to 
preconceived notions of deservingness, often occurring after the “housing visitor” (often, a 
middle aged, middle class female local government employee) came to discuss rehousing with the 
applicant(s).25 In 1993, 92 per cent of local authorities excluded certain households from their 
waiting lists.26  So, although it can properly be argued that the production of social housing was a 
means to manage the poor, it is also clear that only certain poor households were included in this 
process of what has been described as “moral cleansing”.27 
The Housing Act 1996, Part 6, formalised the social housing allocations process.  Previously, 
legislation contained only vague reference to prioritisation through reasonable preference.28  The 
1996 Act, for the first time, set out a requirement on local authorities to have a housing register 
and a published allocation scheme.29   Local authorities were given the power to “decide what 
classes of persons are, or are not, qualifying persons” and therefore to decide who was entitled to 
appear on the register (subject to statutory and quasi-statutory inclusions and exclusions).30  
Certain persons from abroad were also made non-qualifying persons.31  The accompanying Code 
of Guidance, to which local authorities were required to refer, provided examples of the 
categories of households central government believed could be “non-qualifying”: 
people with a history of anti-social behaviour, people who have attacked housing department 
staff, or tenants with a record of rent arrears. Authorities could impose other qualifications, such 
as those related to residency in the authority’s district or ownership of a property, although they 
may wish to consider the implications of excluding all members of such groups, eg elderly owner-
occupiers.32 
                                                          
24 See, for example, the discussions in Central Housing Advisory Committee, Selection of Tenants and Transfers and 
Exchanges, 3rd Report (London: HMSO, 1949); id, Council Housing Purposes, Procedures and Priorities, 9th Report (London: 
HMSO, 1969). 
25 See, for example, Central Housing Advisory Committee, Council Housing: Purposes, Procedures and Priorities )London: 
HMSO, 1969); S. Damer and R. Madigan, R. “The housing investigator”, (1974) 25 July, New Society 226; J. Lambert, 
C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State: Allocation, Access and Control (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1978). 
26 W. Bines, P. Kemp, N. Pleace and C. Radley, Managing Social Housing (London: HMSO, 1993), para 9.28.  The 
most commonly employed exclusions were where the household had other suitable alternatives; former tenants with 
rent arrears outstanding; and applicants below an age limit.  Most providers also had a local connection requirement: 
paras 9.29-33.  This suggested considerable continuity with the Central Housing Advisory Committee report 
findings from 1969. 
27 The early link between housing management and the Public Health department’s interest in housing as a social 
practice sought “to systematise the surveillance, control and moralisation of the burgeoning working class”: S. 
Damer, “’Engineers of the human machine’: The social practice of council housing management in Glasgow, 1895-
1939”, (2000) 37(11) Urban Studies 2007. 
28 The first provisions can be traced back to 1924, and were codified in the Housing Act 1985, Part II. 
29 S. 168. 
30 S. 161(4). 
31 S. 161(1)-(3). 
32 Department of the Environment, Allocation of Housing Accommodation and Homelessness (London: DoE, 1996), 4.27. 
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It was said33 that the most common exclusion under that Act, as originally enacted, excluded 
those with rent arrears, without a “local connection”34 with the authority, those guilty of anti-
social behaviour, under 18s,35 and owner-occupiers. 
Despite a commitment to remove the qualifying persons provision in their 1997 election 
manifesto, it was not until the Homelessness Act 2002 that New Labour reversed it.  The 
exclusion of households from abroad remained, but local authorities were prevented from 
making other households non-qualifying.  There were good reasons for doing so, in line with the 
choice-based lettings (a market-based model of social housing allocation, requiring households to 
be active in their search by bidding for the property they wanted)36 and equalities agendas, as well 
as an ambition that lists would reflect housing need in the area.  Further, it was in line with 
recommendations made by the then disbanded Central Housing Advisory Committee.37  
However, this was not a completely altruistic policy, because it was also clear that the previous 
mantra of “allocation according to need” was also breaking down.  As the 2000 Green Paper 
made clear: “We do not believe that social housing should only be allocated to the poorest and 
most vulnerable members of the community … [W]e recognise that there may be occasions 
when it is necessary and desirable, for some wider community benefit, to allow exceptions to 
this”.38  The ability to exclude households from the list was replaced with a discretionary power 
to alter a household’s priority as a result of behaviour which “affects his suitability to be a 
tenant”, and financial resources.39  After the 2009 local elections, when the British National Party 
made some gains, albeit very limited, guidance was issued which suggested that local connection 
could be taken into account as a “policy priority” in allocations decisions.40 
The Coalition government returned the original power to exclude to local authorities in the 
Localism Act 2011.  The rationale was that “open waiting lists” had encouraged households to 
                                                          
33 S. Butler, Access Denied: The Exclusion of People in Need from Social Housing (London: Shelter, 1998). 
34 This phrase requires some explanation.  It is widely used in housing circles, currently appearing in the 
homelessness legislation (Housing Act 1996, Part 7), but has its basis in early settlement rules under the Poor Laws – 
see R. Cranston, Legal Foundations of the Welfare State (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978).  It is usually taken to 
mean that, subject to certain limitations (eg in relation to those fleeing domestic violence), a household must have 
lived in an area for more than a set period.  It has become an apparently accepted aspect of social housing 
allocations policy, one to which all signed up in 1996 (HL Debs, vol 573, cols 345-6), but see the trenchant critique 
of such policies in CHAC, 1969, ch 4. 
35 This was a product of issues relating to the grant of a tenancy to under 18s, although other moral registers were 
also in operation: D. Cowan, Homelessness: The (In-)Appropriate Applicant (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997). 
36 The system is discussed in A. Marsh et al, Piloting Choice-Based Lettings: An Evaluation, (London: ODPM, 2003). 
37 Selection of Tenants and Transfers and Exchanges, 3rd Report (London: HMSO, 1949); id, Council Housing Purposes, 
Procedures and Priorities, 9th Report (London: HMSO, 1969). 
38 Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions/Department of Social Security, Quality and Choice: A 
Decent Home for All - The Housing Green Paper (London: DETR/DSS, 2000), para 9.12. 
39 S. 167(2A). 
40 CLG, Fair and Flexible, Statutory Guidance on Social Housing Allocations for Local Authorities in England, 
(London: CLG, 2010), 63. 
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put their names down on the list where they had no real need for housing, and created “false 
expectations” in areas where demand outstripped supply.41  The guidance offered to local 
authorities about the new exclusion provision was rather more nuanced than that offered in 
1996.  It recognised that authorities had to balance their new power against their equalities 
obligations, the requirement to give reasonable preference to certain categories of household.  
There was also a more nuanced framing of exclusions and a suggestion that there should be an 
allowance for “exceptional circumstances”; and that they “should avoid setting criteria which 
disqualify groups of people whose members are likely to be accorded reasonable preference for 
social housing”.42  Alongside this guidance, though, was a requirement by Statutory Instrument 
that local authorities could not apply local connection rules to certain members of the armed 
forces.43   
Subsequent guidance reinforced the government’s view that local authorities “should prioritise 
applicants who can demonstrate a close association with the local area”;44 indeed, rather stronger 
than has appeared before in Statutory guidance.45 “The Secretary of State believes that including 
a residency requirement is appropriate and strongly encourages all housing authorities to adopt 
such an approach.  The Secretary of State believes that a reasonable period of residency would be 
at least two years."46 This reflects an odd contradiction at the heart of social housing policy – the 
Coalition government (as those before it) emphasised the need for mobility,47 while at the same 
time prioritising local connection. 
There is a clear tension in localism, however, between a coherent national scheme and local 
schemes.48  As Maclennan and O’Sullivan put it, “a commitment to localism in housing policy 
does not mean the abandonment of coherent housing policies and governance mechanisms at 
national, regional and metropolitan scales, and that a simple localisation of housing policy can 
dangerously hamper the development of effective, efficient and flexible housing systems”.49  So, 
                                                          
41 CLG, Local Decisions: A Fairer Future for Social Housing, Consultation (London: CLG, 2010), paras 4.5-6. 
42 CLG, Allocation of Accommodation: Guidance for Local Housing Authorities in England (London: CLG, 2012), 3.18-3.22. 
43 Allocation of Housing (Qualification Criteria for Armed Forces) (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1869. 
44 CLG, Providing Social Housing for Local People: Statutory Guidance on Social Housing Allocations for Local Authorities in 
England (London: CLG, 2013), 12. 
45 Subject to the exception that “[i]t is important that housing authorities retain the flexibility to take proper account 
of special circumstances”: 19. 
46 Ibid, 13. 
47 CLG, Local Decisions: A Fairer Future for Social Housing, Consultation (London: CLG, 2010), section 5. 
48 See the interpretation of the Council Tax reduction scheme: R(Winder) v Sandwell MBC [2014] EWHC 2617 
(Admin), [60], Hickinbottom J describing the scheme as “despite the principle of localism, to maintain a certain 
amount of consistency”. 
49 D. Maclennan and A. O’Sullivan, “Localism, devolution and housing policies”, (2013) 28(4) Housing Studies 599, 
607; see also C. Hunter, “Localism, centralism and housing rights”, (2012) 15(1) Journal of Housing Law, 63, 65, who 
argues that that the Coalition government’s version of localism was presented as “advantageous over ‘inflexible 
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a tension exists between local exclusions, regional allocation schemes, and national housing 
policy.  If national housing policy is so vulnerable that households should be prioritised,50 then 
an exclusion makes no sense.  Similarly, if a household is excluded by one local authority, a 
rational householder might be expected to seek out an alternative local authority not subject to 
such an exclusion   Thus, the local pressure is likely to be to maintain qualification criteria at least 
similar, if not more strict, than your neighbour.  There is the potential for a race to the bottom, 
although, as we shall see, that may not have occurred in practice. 
The relevant provisions of the Localism Act 2011 were brought in to force in January 2012.  By 
that stage, the size of local authority waiting lists had grown annually.  By 1st April 2012, there 
were 1,851,426 households on waiting lists in England.  The most recently published statistics 
show that, as at 1st April 2014, there has been a 26 per cent decrease in that number (there were 
1,368,312 households on waiting lists in England).51  The bottom line is that nearly 500,000 
households have apparently been wiped off waiting lists.  It has been recognised by government 
that local authorities’ “freedom to manage their own waiting list” is “probably partly responsible 
for this decrease”.52  In that same year, 2013-14, there was a slight increase in the number of 
social housing general needs lettings (approximately 293,000 lettings were made).53  Internal 
transfers – which happen off register so to speak, as they are not now included on waiting lists54 
– made up 23 per cent of all such lettings.55 
The judicial approach 
It is instructive to consider the interaction of the courts, local authorities and allocation schemes. 
As one commentator has observed, after a period in which social housing allocation schemes 
were subject to intense scrutiny, allocation schemes have been “de-judicialised” as a result of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
centrally-determined rules’ but inflexible centrally determined rules can also be characterised as a national code of 
protective, justiciable rights”. 
50 As appears to be the case by reference to the categories of household to which reasonable preference must accrue 
on allocation schemes: s 166ZA, Housing Act 1996. 
51 Table 600, Rents Lettings and tenancies: Numbers of Households on Local Authorities’ Housing Waiting Lists, by 
District: England 1997-2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-rents-lettings-
and-tenancies (last accessed, 19th May 2015). 
52 DCLG, Local Authority Housing Statistics: Year Ending March 2014, Housing Statistical Release (London: DCLG, 
2015), p. 6 (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/local-authority-housing-statistics-year-ending-march-2014, 
last accessed 19th May 2015). 
53 Core data, table 1a, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/rents-lettings-and-tenancies (last accessed, 19th 
May 2015).  “General needs” social lettings are those lettings, other than for supported housing, by local authorities 
and private registered providers.  They include lettings at “social rent” (below market rent) and “affordable rent” (80 
per cent of the market rent). 
54 This was a further change made by the Localism Act 2011; the effect of competition between new lettings and 
transfers is discussed in D. Clapham and K. Kintrea, “Rationing, choice and constraint: The allocation of public 
housing in Glasgow”, (1986) 15(1) Journal of Social Policy 51. 
55 Core data, table 2f, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/rents-lettings-and-tenancies (last accessed, 19th 
May 2015). 
10 
 
House of Lords decision in R(Ahmad) v Newham London Borough Council.56  The court refused to 
interfere with Newham’s broad brush allocations scheme, which was based on date order (i.e. 
priority within broad bands was determined on the date on which applicants applied for 
accommodation).  They did so because the statutory scheme gave authorities broad powers; and 
“it seems unlikely that the legislature can have intended that Judges should embark on the 
exercise of telling authorities how to decide on priorities as between applicants in need of 
rehousing, save in relatively rare and extreme circumstances.  Housing allocation policy is a 
difficult exercise which requires not only social and political sensitivity and judgment, but also 
local expertise and knowledge”.57  
However, the court has shown itself to be more willing since implementation of the Localism 
Act 2011 to intervene to strike down perceived unfairness in the design and operation of 
allocation schemes. One such scheme, that of Hammersmith and Fulham LBC, warrants closer 
attention. Under this scheme, homeless households in long-term accommodation were excluded 
from appearing on their list, treated as non-qualifying households.  At a stroke, this meant that 
87 per cent of households were excluded.  Homeless households are, however, statutorily 
accorded “reasonable preference” under the 1996 Act, as amended.58  The reasoning behind the 
exclusion was said to be that “the Council is recognising an obvious but often neglected truth – 
i.e. that the housing needs of applicants owed the main housing duty are not uniform and that 
very often the quality of the accommodation provided in discharge of the main housing duty is 
such that the Council can reasonably conclude that an applicant’s current housing needs are 
met”.59  The Court of Appeal struck this exclusion down.  First, it was said that excluding 
entirely a proportion of households entitled to reasonable preference was outside the statutory 
scheme.60  An allocation “scheme” included not just those entitled to an allocation but also those 
excluded.  This view was supported by the guidance (to which reference has been made above).  
Secondly, and perhaps less persuasively given the House of Lords’ approach in Ahmed, the Court 
held that the exclusion of such a large proportion of applicants effectively thwarted the statutory 
scheme, despite the flexibility allowed to an authority in the term “reasonable preference”.  
Tomlinson LJ doubted whether “either these proceedings have achieved any practical purpose or 
that the Claimant will derive any benefit from our decision” because it was observed that the 
                                                          
56 [2009] UKHL 14, [2009] 3 All ER 755. 
57 [47]. 
58 S. 166ZA(3). 
59 R(Jakimaviciute) v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2014] EWCA Civ 1438. 
60 Cf R(Hilsden) v Epping Forest DC [2015] EWHC 98 (Admin), which is something of an outlier but in which a 
scheme requiring continuous residence for three years, without an exceptional circumstances clause, was upheld as 
lawful. 
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council could simply adjust their allocation scheme so as to arrive at the same conclusion.61 A 
consideration of the judicial treatment of local authority allocation schemes provides one of the 
contexts in which our survey of 50 allocation schemes must be analysed.  It is to this survey that 
we now turn. 
Local exclusions: Methodology 
In Summer 2014, we conducted an electronic survey of a selection of 50 local authorities’ 
qualifying criteria, purposively sampled by reference to geographical area, political control, and 
whether rural/urban.  The ‘geographical area’ element was selected on the basis of regional area, 
as used to be provided by the Department of Communities and Local Government in 
presentation of their statistics until 2011.62  ‘Political control’ and ‘rural/urban’ have both been 
indicated in past research to be relevant factors in analysing waiting lists.  As authorities are 
required to publish their schemes, the focus on the actual allocations schemes meant that they 
were relatively easy to access online.63  We downloaded each of the published schemes and, for 
the purposes of this article, analysed their qualification criteria.  As qualification criteria are more 
than “a matter of mere detail” (for example, because affected households can request a review of 
a negative decision),64 they are required to be included in the published allocations scheme.  
Thus, they appear on the face of the scheme.  We coded them initially into four broad 
qualification criteria relating to (generalised) ‘nuisance and anti-social behaviour’, ‘local 
connection’, ‘rent arrears’, and ‘other’.  We used these categories because of the experience under 
the Housing Act 1996 as originally drafted, but, as we demonstrate below, the “other” criteria 
encompasses a range of more specific exclusions, some of which are used by a large proportion 
of our sample. 
It is important to note that local authorities were sampled and not other providers of social 
housing (such as other social landlords).  The reason for that limitation was because local 
authority allocation schemes tend to be the gateway to all social housing in an area, either 
because they operate “common housing registers” with other providers or because the authority 
has large proportion of nomination rights over other social housing in their area.65  One reason 
for this purposive sampling was that, although many local authorities were involved in regional 
                                                          
61 [52]. 
62 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-rents-lettings-and-tenancies, table 601 (last 
accessed 22nd December 2014). 
63 S. 168(1).  By way of methodological footnote, in a small number of cases, local authorities were unable to provide 
their scheme, either because it was being updated or it was not available.  In such cases, we simply selected another 
authority in the same region. 
64 Lin v Barnet LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 132, [48], Dyson LJ. 
65 It is known that other providers can, and do, exclude nominees for their own reasons, but that is beside the point.  
If a household is excluded from the list, that is likely to be the end of the social housing process. 
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schemes including in London, they tend to maintain their own non-qualification categories.  It is 
realistic to suppose that different authorities in different regions, and perhaps within the same 
region, would have different categories if the “local” emphasis has purchase.  It might also have 
been anticipated that a local connection emphasis would be more prevalent in rural areas, where 
there is a greater emphasis on maintaining locality in a limited housing stock.  London, of course, 
is a different housing market altogether, as reflected in the Mayor’s powers in relation to social 
housing construction, the extremely limited social housing stock, the high cost of living (such 
that restrictions on benefits cause particular problems), and the large-scale export of homeless 
households in out-of-area placements.  However, one of the most interesting findings of this 
project is that the various factors that were taken in to account in our sampling did not appear to 
reflect exclusion policies.  
There is a further and particular limit of our survey.  We do not have the internal reports to the 
local authority committees which approved the new allocations schemes.  Local authority data 
suggest that 60 per cent of local authorities have altered their allocation schemes since the 
Localism Act 2010.66  Each change would have been supported by an officer’s report.  
Transparency applies only to the allocation scheme itself, which must be published.67  Therefore, 
we do not have the local authority perspective for the changes.  There is no particular proxy that 
can be used either – for example, local authorities are required to produce a homelessness 
strategy and a tenancy strategy (and, for London, its own housing strategy),68 but these 
documents do not provide the basis for alterations. 
Local exclusions: Outcomes 
We analysed our sample of allocation schemes by reference to four particular categories, drawing 
on the experiences under the 1996 Act as first settled, the current guidance, and newspaper 
reports of exclusions as they were appearing.69  These sources suggested the likely prevalence of 
three categories of non-qualifying households: those with rent arrears, without a local 
connection, and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.  An “other” category was also maintained to 
account for other types of exclusion.  The manner in which local authorities constructed their 
non-qualifying categories beyond these broad labels was also of interest to us - for example, the 
measure of rent arrears giving rise to exclusion from allocation schemes. If local connection was 
                                                          
66 Local Authority Housing Statistics, 2013-4, Table C: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/local-
authority-housing-statistics-data-returns-for-2013-to-2014 (last accessed, 19th May 2015). 
67 S. 168, Housing Act 1996. 
68 Respectively s. 1, Homelessness Act 2002; s. 150, Localism Act 2011.  Local authorities in England must have 
regard to such documents in producing their allocations scheme: s. 166A(12), Housing Act 1996. 
69 H. Spurr, “Locked out”, Inside Housing 2nd May 2014. 
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a category, how long does a household have to have an association with the area?  And, if anti-
social behaviour, what type and what proof was required?   
 
General 
Every local authority surveyed had some form of qualification criterion.  Beyond that, the 
general results of our survey were that, as regards the specific, named exclusions:  
- 44 authorities had qualification criteria for nuisance or anti-social behaviour, 3 authorities 
had no such exclusion, and for 3 others it went to prioritisation (i.e. an applicant’s 
prioritisation on the list could be reduced because of such behaviour). 
- 27 local authorities had qualification criteria for local connection, 3 had no such 
exclusion, and for 20 others it went to prioritisation. 
- 30 local authorities had qualification criteria for rent arrears, 8 did not, and for 12 others 
it went to prioritisation. 
Where an authority was coded as not having a relevant named qualification criterion, that does 
not necessarily mean that there was no sanction.  So, for example, West Berkshire DC did not 
“exclude” an applicant for rent arrears but “defers” their application.70  Similarly, the London 
Borough of Enfield did not “exclude” an applicant for rent arrears but “suspends” the 
application.71  Sheffield City Council’s modus in respect of anti-social behaviour was to retain 
discretion either to “suspend [a household’s] registration” or “otherwise restrict it”.  Effectively, 
even where there was no qualification criterion, de-prioritisation and “suspension” or 
“deferment” may well amount to the same thing (particularly in high demand areas).72   
Much of this is not surprising.  What is surprising, however, is the low number of local 
authorities which had an explicit qualification criterion for local connection.  Given the emphasis 
on the “local” in the Localism Act 2011, there was an assumption that this would be the most 
significant qualification criterion of qualifying status (and it had been a prominent exclusion 
under the 1996 Act as originally settled). It nevertheless turned out to be a far less prominent 
criterion in our sampled schemes than anticipated.  Indeed, the same is true for past rent arrears.  
The significant number of local authorities with an explicit nuisance/anti-social behaviour 
                                                          
70 Before the deferment will be lifted, applicants need to demonstrate that they have made and adhered to an agreed 
payment plan for a period of at least three months and/or that the arrears have been cleared or have been reduced 
below eight weeks rent. 
71 Applicants with more than eight times the weekly accommodation charge or have not maintained a payment 
agreement for six months will have application suspended until arrears repaid or payment plan maintained for six 
months. 
72 And it is notable that most (but not all) such formulations were in high demand areas. 
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qualification criterion can be explained by the increasing attention given to tackling anti-social 
behaviour by policy-makers and its depiction as a social housing problem reaching back as early as 
the 1990s.73 
 
As to the category of ‘other’ qualification criteria, Table 1 below indicates the range and 
frequency of particular criteria: 
Table 1: “Other” Exclusions 
Exclusion Number of local 
authorities 
Making false or misleading 
statements to obtain a 
tenancy 
29 
Owning own home 26 
Income and/or capital 
threshold limits 
22 
Previous eviction on a 
Housing Act ground 
11 
Causing Damage or waste to 
property 
8 
Deliberately worsening 
personal circumstances 
6 
Any other criminal offence 5 
Previous acts of domestic 
violence and/or racist abuse 
and/or harassment 
3 
High risk household 2 
 
 
In addition, households with high care needs, refusing an offer of accommodation, squatters, 
and poor tenancy report were excluded by one local authority each. There are clear overlaps with 
nuisance/anti-social behaviour as regards some of these criteria and others are either high profile 
housing issues (such as making a false or misleading statement to obtain a social housing 
tenancy), covered by strong guidance,74 or are high profile housing allocation issues (such as the 
                                                          
73 See, for example, J. Flint, “Social housing agencies and the governance of anti-social behaviour”, (2002) 17(4) 
Housing Studies 619; K. Jacobs, J. Kemeny and T. Manzi, “‘Power, discursive space and institutional practices in the 
construction of housing problems”, (2003) 18(4) Housing Studies 429; A. Brown, “Anti-Social behaviour, crime 
control and social control”, (2004) 43(2) Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 203. 
74 So, for example, the Allocations Code makes a strong statement regarding home owners: “The Government 
believes that authorities should avoid allocating social housing to people who already own their own homes”: para 
3.23. 
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income and/or capital restriction75).  Even the more apparently contentious qualification criteria, 
such as an unsatisfactory tenancy report (Durham CC), have a history in social housing allocation 
which would not overly surprise a housing academic or professional.76 
Specifics 
It is to be noted that, as regards each of the named exclusions, the policies use similar, almost 
generic formulations (although the specifics are rather different, as discussed below).  It is not 
surprising because, as Spicker noted, there were similarities in allocations policies in the 1980s 
because practitioners shared views with each other and drew on government Guidance; further, 
“[m]any housing departments face similar pressures, and they respond with similar policies as a 
result”.77   
Perhaps the most significant underlying reason for this similarity in phrasing and scheme 
formulation is legislative and quasi-legislative framing of the qualification.  So, for example, as 
regards nuisance/anti-social behaviour, the most common formulation was: “An applicant (or a 
member of their household) found to have engaged in unacceptable behaviour serious enough 
for the landlord to pursue court action had they been a tenant” –  or unacceptable behaviour that 
was serious enough for a court to order possession (n=39) – a formulation of unacceptable 
behaviour that was previously found in section 160(8) of the Housing Act 1996, prior to the 
Localism Act amendments.78  Similarly, the general definition of “local connection” was tied to 
that provided in the homelessness legislation and the local authority agreed protocol.79  Although 
less frequent, a common formulation for rent arrears was the equivalent of a Housing Act 1985 
or 1988 ground for possession “rent lawfully due that has not been paid (current or former 
tenancy)”.80 
Once the analysis becomes more fine-grained, however, distinctions and considerable scope for 
discretion emerge.  So, for example, on rent arrears, a common expression of the qualification 
criterion was “significant rent arrears”.  Some local authorities were explicit as to what this meant 
– the range was from two weeks arrears (Northampton) to 14 weeks, the median being eight 
weeks (n=4; including three local authorities in the South West).  Where a precise figure was 
stated, the most common figure used was £1,000 (n=5).  However, 17 local authorities provided 
                                                          
75 DCLG, High Income Social Tenants: Pay to Stay, Consultation (London: DCLG, 2012).   
76 This was the sort of practice favoured by Octavia Hill’s followers, and which was common practice until the late 
1970s 
77 P. Spicker, “Concepts of need in housing allocation”, (1987) 15(1) Policy and Politics 17, 24. 
78 This provision still applies in Wales: s. 160A(8). 
79 S. 199; Procedure for Referrals of Homeless Applications on the Grounds of Local Connection with another Local Authority, 
reproduced as Annex 18, Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities (London: DCLG, 2006), para 4.1. 
80 Grounds 1 and 10 respectively. 
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no definition of significant rent arrears (although some reduced prioritisation for low or 
moderate arrears81).  Only East Riding of Yorkshire DC in our sample expressed a clear 
limitation period as regards rent arrears – two years.  The same is true of nuisance/anti-social 
behaviour, although here most local authorities provided the generic descriptor followed by lists 
of relevant conduct.82  Where authorities excluded applicants above a threshold of behaviour, 
many would also give less priority to applicants who made it on to the list but with arrears or 
behaviour below the threshold. 
Similar observations can be made in relation to local connection.  14 local authorities, in fact, 
departed from the local authority protocol when it came to the specific periods of residence in 
the locality.  The range of these periods was from six months to 10 years (Hillingdon LBC), with 
one local authority (Kingston-upon-Thames RLBC) providing no specific period.  The median 
specific period was three years (n=4).  All London boroughs (other than Kingston) surveyed had 
a specific period of residence required, ranging from two years (Havering LBC) to 10 years.  
Ealing and Greenwich had 5 year requirements; Hackney a 3 year requirement; Newham a 2 year 
requirement; City of London a 12 month requirement.83  The range here was surprising, in part 
because of the move to a pan-London allocations scheme and the conflict with regional 
consistency.  Whether or not such lengthier periods survive must be open to some doubt and are 
likely to be susceptible to challenge.84 
In relation to rent arrears and nuisance/anti-social behaviour (although less so in relation to the 
latter), some local authorities offered some degree of redemption.  In all such cases, the onus is 
clearly on the applicant to demonstrate some behavioural change.  As regards rent arrears, where 
the applicant entered in to a re-payment plan, 20 local authorities across our entire sample either 
took this in to account in deciding on qualification, prioritisation, or 
“postponement/suspension”.  At a more detailed level, however, a number of authorities either 
required the applicant to have been meeting the relevant payments regularly for (say) six months 
(Stevenage, Hackney, and Hillingdon).  For others in our sample, the degree of commitment to 
repayment of arrears was merely a relevant factor to be taken into account either to bolster or 
                                                          
81 Except Middlesbrough MBC which specifically included low to moderate arrears as “unacceptable behaviour”. 
82 The following were included as examples: ASBO granted (n=7); criminal proceedings had been successfully 
instigated (17); dogs (1); domestic violence/racists abuse and/or harassment (15); eviction for breach of tenancy 
obligation (10); history of anti-social behaviour (9); use of a property for immoral or illegal purposes (11); noise (1); 
property neglect or damage (9); abuse of staff (7); acts of violence (2). 
83 City of London is the smallest London borough for these purposes. 
84 In R(Winder) v Sandwell MBC, Hickinbottom J accepted the ground of challenge to that authority’s council tax 
reduction scheme, which had a local connection element, on the basis that it constituted a barrier to freedom of 
movement and was indirectly discriminatory in EU law: [80]-[90]; see also the discussion of Barnet LBC’s 
consultation on changes to its allocation scheme: http://nearlylegal.co.uk/blog/2014/08/waiting-wait/ (last 
accessed 29th December 2014).  
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weaken an individual’s case. So, for example, Preston BC express their qualification criterion in 
part as where the applicant has a housing related debt up to £1,000 and has not made a re-
payment plan which has been maintained in accordance with the policy; however, an applicant 
will qualify if the re-payment plan has been maintained for a minimum of 3 months for debts of 
up to £500.   
5 local authorities across our sample offer “redemption” to those who might otherwise have 
been excluded for nuisance/anti-social behaviour.  The usual requirement was that the applicant 
has changed their behaviour for a certain period.  Northumberland DC, for example, may 
exercise its discretion in favour of qualification where there is evidence of the applicant’s 
improved behaviour over a sustained period of time; Hillingdon LBC, which does not exclude 
but “verifies” applicants, will not so verify an applicant unless they can demonstrate a change in 
their behaviour for a minimum of 12 months at the time of an allocation.   
Qualification and social theory 
In this section, we are concerned with the ways in which social theory has been, or might be, 
deployed to explain social housing allocations.  We draw attention to four particular 
explanations: a form of advanced liberalism; actuarialism and risk; class war Conservatism; and 
authoritarian liberalism.  Our argument is that our data disrupts such neat theoretical 
explanations, and we should be led by our data rather than resort to the cookie cutter. 
Some qualification criteria have the ethical self at their heart – what we have termed 
‘redemption’.  They fit neatly in to post-Foucauldian governmentality studies which focus on 
advanced or neo-liberal political rationalities exhorting people to work on themselves.  They 
promise to remove the stain of disqualification if the applicant improves themselves (such as, for 
example, making and keeping an arrangement to pay back rent arrears).  Applicants can break 
the “circuit of exclusion” to which they have been marked.  However, that explanation is rather 
too simple because, for some, that stain cannot be removed whatever action the applicant takes.  
Local connection is neither liberal, nor neo-liberal nor advanced liberal as a political rationality.  
There is no apparent purpose to the exercise of the exclusionary power in this case because it 
does not affect an individual’s self-government.85   
                                                          
85 A similar set of arguments can be deployed against the revival in housing studies of Bourdieu’s notion of the 
bureaucratic field, as developed by Wacquant, op cit n 7; also in K. Jacobs and T. Manzi, “Investigating the new 
landscapes of welfare: Housing policy, politics and the emerging research agenda”, (2014) 31(2) Housing, Theory and 
Society 213, 220-1. 
18 
 
Perhaps an actuarial approach, with which criminal justice scholars are familiar,86 offers a rather 
better explanation.  As Dean puts it, risk “is a way of representing events in a certain form so 
they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular 
goals”.87  Cowan, Pantazis and Gilroy have considered the way social housing allocation embeds 
risk-based assessment and management within its processes.  They claim that, in social housing 
selection processes “risk has always been the central principle; this has simply become more 
apparent in recent years.  Selection processes have been designed to assess the risks posed by 
particular individuals both to the management of social housing as well as to the safety of the 
community.  If a person is regarded as ‘risky’, they are likely to be excluded from social housing 
or allocated stock which nobody else wants”.88 That claim was made in the context of a study of 
the rehousing of sex offenders, in a situation in which the risk management of the offender 
clearly imbued the entire allocation process.   
One can see the calculability of risk in relation to some of the exclusions.  So, for example, rent 
arrears are a risk to a social housing organisation, whose business plan will be predicated on the 
collection of a particular proportion of rent as its income.  The exclusion of a bad payer is a fairly 
crude risk management device; the re-inclusion of those applicants who have kept to a 
repayment plan can properly be described as a more fine-tuned risk assessment process.  The 
management of nuisance/anti-social behaviour is financially and emotionally costly to social 
housing organisations and, thus, the exclusion of those households is readily explicable in the 
language of risk.  However, risk does not provide a general explanation for the complete array of 
exclusions.  It cannot explain local connection.  Indeed, the argument made was that social 
housing provides spaces and places in which the risky can be controlled, whereas our focus here 
is on the excluded, rather than the punitive containment of households on estates.89  Thus, our 
argument departs from the assertion that risk has always been the central principle defining 
social housing selection. 
Drawing on Ralph Miliband’s description of the Thatcher government as exercising “class war 
conservatism”, some have argued that Coalition government housing policy was largely 
completing the job.  Hodkinson and Robbins argue that “[h]ousing policy is being used as a 
strategic intervention to unblock and expand the market, complete the residualisation of social 
housing and draw people into an ever more economically precarious housing experience in order 
                                                          
86 M. Feeley and J. Simon, “The new penology. Notes on the emerging strategy of corrections and its implications”, 
(1992) 30(4) Criminology 449; also P. O’Malley’s sophisticated take on the agonism at the heart of penology: “Volatile 
and contradictory punishment” (1999) 3(2) Theoretical Criminology 175. 
87 M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999), 177. 
88 D. Cowan, R. Gilroy and C. Pantazis, “Risking housing need”, (1999) 26(4) Journal of Law and Society 403, 406. 
89 We are here drawing on Wacquant, op cit n 7. 
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to boost capitalist interests”.90  On this view, the expanding category of unhouseables provides 
fodder for an ever more ravenous private rented sector or owner-occupation, which are being 
fed also on a diet of occupiers’ welfare benefits.  Thus, the stigmatisation of social housing as 
providing “ghettos” for the “welfare poor” is part of a discursive formation in which capital is 
benefiting.  However, the empirical evidence does not support this proposition either – private 
landlords are risk averse, unlikely to provide housing to those in receipt of welfare benefits, and 
mortgage lenders unlikely to enter such risky markets because of the stringent entry rules post-
crash.91  There is also the point that the qualification criteria predate Thatcher, and the roots of 
local connection can be found in the local settlement provisions of the Poor Laws.92 
It appears therefore that what we are left with is that no one approach fits all the qualification 
criteria.  A range of potential explanations - path-dependency, institutionalism (in the sense that 
institutions are enduring collections of rules, structures and standard procedures), and various 
formats of neo-liberalism - co-exist.  The shadow of the past is lengthy.93  Local connection 
forms a qualification criterion because of its pertinent history from settlement under the Poor 
Law on, its spatial defence against “outsiders”, and its reinvigoration as a criterion as a result of a 
certain form of nationalism.94   
To refer to the qualification criteria as “neo-liberal” requires some further explanation.  After all, 
these criteria are punitive sanctions and, as discussed above, only certain of the authorities 
surveyed allowed for individuals to ‘redeem’ themselves and qualify under a scheme.   Scholars 
of neo-liberal governmentality have recognised the authoritarianism inherent within it.  Dean, for 
example, argues that “authoritarian foldings” arise as a result of the joining up of state 
organisations and civil society, such as the tenant participation movement, the enfolding of civil 
society processes into the political sphere, and the refolding of the values of civil society into the 
political sphere.  The important point to note here is that civil society norms are translated into a 
set of norms enforceable, if necessary, by sovereign action.95  This has the benefit of reinforcing 
what is often forgotten in governmentality studies, and that is that Foucault himself emphasised 
the triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government, not the displacement of one by the other.  
                                                          
90 Op cit n 96, 59. 
91 See generally, D. Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
92 See R. Cranston, Legal Foundations of the Welfare State (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), pp 22-6. 
93 Although it should be said that, even in 1949, the Central Housing Advisory Committee recognised that “A 
[person’s] need for a house is not affected by local authority boundaries or by the length of time [s/he] has lived or 
worked within them”; and recommended that such conditions be abolished “as soon as conditions permit”: Selection 
of Tenants and Transfers and Exchanges, 3rd Report (London: HMSO, 1949), para 13.  The 1969 report was “… firmly of 
the conviction that there should be no barrier to acceptance on a housing list”: para 169. 
94 op cit n 84. 
95 M. Dean, “Liberal government and authoritarianism”, (2002) 31(1) Economy and Society 37, 45-6. 
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Indeed, as he put it, the problem of sovereignty is made more acute than ever by advances in the 
theory of government.  And, as Valverde argued, illiberal practices of moral governance are “a 
seldom noticed but irreducible despotism in the heart of the paradigmatic liberal subject’s 
relation to himself”.96  Dean and Valverde both recognise this as key to appreciating the 
remoralisation strategies of conditionality in welfare.97 
However, even with such more nuanced appreciation of the term “neo-liberal”, the explanation 
remains problematic.  We now turn to explanations from within housing policy itself. 
Qualification criteria and housing policy 
In this section, we are concerned with the interaction between qualification criteria and housing 
policy.  We consider how they fit with explanations of housing allocations that place housing 
need, desert, and sustainability at their forefront.  Our contention in this paper is that these 
qualification criteria have produced a new, expanded generation of “unhouseables”.  The greater 
ability (and apparent willingness) of local government to disqualify more applicants through local 
exclusions together with the increasing numbers of excluded households are evidence of this 
strain.  These are households who are labelled as having some type of former housing deviance – 
they are the “outsiders”: “deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a 
consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’. The deviant is 
one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so 
label”.98  The significant number of households excluded from social housing lists reflect the 
increasing number of outsiders,99 to a certain extent caught in the anomic trap.  These are the 
predominantly risky households and others who can be lumped together. 
Exclusions are not purely to do with housing “need” – indeed, those with rent arrears and past 
histories of anti-social behaviour are likely to have greater need for social housing because of 
their inability to access other housing tenures.  Fitzpatrick and Stephens make a case that “when 
it is said that housing should be allocated to those in most need, what is really meant is that it 
should be allocated to those who are in greatest housing deprivation”, and deprivation should be 
considered over the long-term.100  However, the qualification criteria clearly operate as blunt 
tools independent of housing need. 
                                                          
96 M. Valverde, “’Despotism’ and ethical liberal governance”, (1996) 25(3) Economy and Society 357, 359. 
97 See N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); W. Walters, Unemployment and 
Government (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
98 H. Becker, The Outsiders (New York: Free Press, 1973), 9. 
99 Op cit n 52-4. 
100 Op cit n 3, 420 
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There is an argument that the qualification criteria reflect desert, something which has been 
particularly prevalent in social housing allocation schemes since their foundation.101  The 
justification for desert in allocation schemes is that social housing “consumption provides utility 
not only to those who are housed, but also to those who provide it (‘society’)”.102  If one 
interprets desert in the manner of “moral rectitude”,103 one can see that central government’s 
prescription that armed service personnel are automatically qualifying as a clear example of 
desert,104 but local connection provisions stand in defiance of desert. 
Another way of analysing the qualification criteria which is less pejorative is through the label 
now current in social housing of the need for “sustainability”.  Sustainability has a personal, 
estate, and global implication for social housing.  The personal effect is that tenancies should be 
sustainable, and considerable management effort goes in to that purpose. An estate effect is that 
estates should be sustainable, meaning that they should not be allowed to “slip”, for example as a 
result of the actions of a “bad apple” or a consequence of an unfixed “broken window”.   As 
significant are the increasing concerns about a nebulous category of “outsiders”, often regarded 
as persons from abroad, occupying estates so that family members of households already living 
on the estate cannot be housed there.105   
The implication is that social housing has come to be seen as a residualised tenure – a 
numerically declining tenure with concentrations of poverty: “the poverty of existing social 
tenants is almost certainly a contributory factor in the unattractiveness of the sector for better-
off groups”.106  Social housing and its occupants are stigmatised “as particular locales where 
social pathologies and problems flourish”.107  In order to destigmatise it, it is necessary to exclude 
some households so that the positive role models required can be housed – itself redolent of the 
1938 Central Housing Advisory Committee report which advocated “The bad tenant will learn 
more readily by eye than by ear: example is better than precept”.108 Sustainability implies 
                                                          
101 A point discussed in detail in D. Cowan and M. McDermont, Regulating Social Housing: Governing Decline, (London: 
Routledge Glasshouse, 2006), ch 4. 
102 Fitzpatrick & Stephens, op cit n 3, 427. 
103 A phrase used by the Cullingworth committee: CHAC, Council Housing, Purposes and Priorities, 9th Report (London: 
HMSO, 1969), 33. 
104 DCLG, Laying the Foundations: A Housing Strategy for England (London: DCLG, 2011), 52; for critique, see S. 
Hodkinson and G. Robbins, “The return of class war conservatism? Housing under the UK Coalition government” 
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conditionality: the purpose of social housing is now linked with broader welfare policy,109 
something which has become current since the mid-1990s and led to the fin de siècle academic 
debate about the “end of housing policy”.110  Never mind that the data does not support the 
assertions of ghettos with patterns of worklessness and benefit dependency,111 nor the powerful 
role of the state in the production of “advanced marginality”112 amid the austerity trope.113 
The sustainability narrative is certainly powerful but also contradictory.  If social housing is 
“ambulance service” housing, so that access is only granted to those with severe vulnerabilities,114 
then the stigma will be hard to shift.  However, despite its inherent contradictions, this narrative 
provides an underpinning that reflects the backdrop to this new set of problematisations about 
social housing.  To put it another way, exclusions can be seen as a response to the decline in 
housing finance.  The management of social housing has been consistently squeezed since the 
mid-1970s through central government cuts and other processes,115 such as bidding for loans 
which reward those with lower management costs.116  The other major factor here is the 
numerical decline in housing stock – there is now less social housing stock than private rented 
stock for the first time since the 1960s, and the increased tentacles of the right to buy under the 
Coalition government continued to reduce the stock (the same policy is also to be found in the 
Conservative manifesto for this government).117  The basic problem with transparent choice-
based allocation schemes which reflect housing need in an area is that they accentuate 
expectations when those expectations patently cannot be met.118  As Henderson and Karn 
observed in their classic study of institutional discrimination in Birmingham’s allocation scheme 
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in the 1970s, “[w]hat emerges most forcefully from this study is that the management of public 
sector housing cannot be separated from its production. Only in the production of more suitable 
types of housing for families and for the elderly and single, and in the constant up grading of 
existing housing can many allocation problems be brought within manageable limits”.119  This is 
what frames social housing now as “transitional” and “ambulance service” – terms which 
amount to the same thing, namely temporary housing – and also underpins the need for this 
ever-greater category of unhouseables. 
This understanding of sustainability as the guiding rationality ties in with Loic Wacquant’s 
development of Bourdieu’s notion of the “bureaucratic field”.120  As befits one of Bourdieu’s 
students and collaborators,121 Wacquant’s conclusions are broad, stark and critical.122  He argues 
that social and penal policy should not be isolated from each other because they “function in 
tandem at the bottom of the structure of classes and places”.123  He begins with a treatise on 
social in/security, neo-Darwinism, and penality, which results partly in the “most disruptive 
elements” being “neutralize[d] and warehouse[d]”.124 What for our purposes is significant about 
this argument is that, like Bourdieu, Wacquant is rigorously empirical.  It is this which enables 
him, for example, to differentiate the specificities of urban marginality in the US and France.125   
It is this methodological proposition that we advocate,126 one which links method with institutional 
analysis, and to which we return in our conclusion.  Theory is derived from our data but not 
completely abstracted from “the macrostructural determinants that, although ostensibly absent 
from the neighbourhood, still govern the practices and representations of its residents because 
they are inscribed in the material distribution of resources and social possibles as well as lodged 
inside bodies in the form of categories of perception, appreciation and action.”127  If this is the 
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case, then, of course, our conclusions from the data are likely to be different and equally 
subjective.128   
Thus, sustainability operates as a link between what Wacquant describes as the tension between 
the left hand and right hand of the state – between the social ministries of state responsible for 
housing and welfare, and the enforcing state, with its economic discipline, resort to punitiveness, 
and judicial enforcement.129   It may be the case that what we now have are segregated spaces of 
“advanced marginality”,130  in which community bonds are disintegrating, where stigmatisation 
and marginalisation are rife, and which operate discursively as framing the “broken society”.131  
But, and this is distinctive about our data, rather than concentrating poverty in degraded spaces, 
social housing qualification criteria provide a crude mechanism to redress and distort those 
problems.  Local connection provisions reinforce community bonds, enabling management to 
govern more efficiently.  Rent arrears and nuisance/anti-social behaviour exclusions destigmatise 
and offer the social housing in an area an opportunity for redemption in its own right.   
However, what Wacquant emphasises is the crucial role of the state and capital in the production 
of such spaces and, indeed, the response.132  The right hand of the state, through the effects of 
austerity policies and other economic practices (such as the whittling away of social housing 
subsidies), has produced this current situation, which others are implementing.  That is not to say 
that those others are coerced (expressly or impliedly) into developing these criteria – precisely 
the reverse. Indeed, the local state’s engagement of these criteria is significant, probably not as an 
explicit response to advanced marginality but to local and national politics.  It should be 
remembered that all of our sample local authorities had qualification criteria of one kind or 
other. 
What is clear is that the onus is on the applicant household to prove that they are not 
unhouseable.  They must have a clean housing record.  And, just as in the old days, what the 
schemes analysed reinforce is the role of discretionary judgment by housing officers.133  
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Definitions of “serious” rent arrears or “unacceptable behaviour” are left open.  In this sense, we 
have returned to the 1970s when “discretion was depicted as the bug in the system - a source of 
deviance which allowed short-term management goals to compromise the principle of social 
justice. It was the smokescreen behind which housing departments infused an agreed hierarchy 
of needs with a range of other, more dubious, allocative principles”.134  It was this kind of 
behaviour which drew such considerable criticism from both left and right in the 1980s.135 
 
Conclusion 
Social housing’s purpose has always been unclear.  It was not part of the post-World War II 
welfare settlement, and, originally, it was too expensive for the poor.136  It is easily manipulated as 
a result.  There has always been a category of “unhouseables” and the extent of that category is 
likely to have varied according to spatial factors and local/national political economy.  Drawing 
on a textual analysis of the qualification criteria of 50 local authority housing allocation schemes, 
our argument is that a process of net-widening and mesh-thinning has occurred, which has 
facilitated a growth in the number of households excluded from social housing – a hiving off of 
a sub-set of “the dispersed and disparate populations caught in the pincer of social and spatial 
marginalization”.137   
As we have identified, previous explorations of social housing allocation schemes have left us ill-
equipped to conceptualise this process.  Schemes which emphasise local connection provide the 
most significant challenge to those explanations.  Other challenges come from sanctions which 
punish what we have termed housing deviance, particularly when schemes appear to offer no 
chance of redemption.  
On one view, the fairly simple response is that the growth of this category of unhouseables is 
due to endogenous factors – a decline in the social housing stock and in the ability of social 
housing management to manage the stock due to financial constraints.  However, many other 
factors are in play: the bureaucratic rule in which the social agencies rub up against the penal 
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complex; the willingness by some to allow for redemption, provided the applicant demonstrably 
changes their behaviour; a return of discretionary judgment for which social housing allocation 
was criticised in the latter part of the twentieth century as a result of the increase of discretion; 
and the vain politics of the government’s good news that they have reduced the size of waiting 
lists, thus reducing housing need by the fairly simple rewriting of the rules.138 In this way, it 
becomes possible to argue that recent incarnations of localism should be viewed as endowing 
local government with greater flexibility in the management of their housing stock rather than 
benefiting would-be social tenants.139  
As we have argued through the analysis of 50 local authority social housing allocation schemes, 
no single theoretical position provides a complete explanation – each provides a partial view on 
certain aspects.  Wacquant’s observations come closest, but that is most likely because they are 
grounded in data, as ours are.  What is different about Wacquant’s analysis from our own is his 
focus on spatial segregation of the urban marginalia as an outcome of policies and practices in 
his analysis – whereas, in our study, the ultimate housing outcome of the “unhouseables” is 
neither known nor inscribed, beyond the label of “private renting” or ‘homeless’.   
Our argument is that a ‘cookie-cutter’ approach to social theory fails to offer a meaningful and 
satisfactory explanation of social housing problems.  What we are advocating, however, is an 
attentiveness to method.140 Our call is for the development of social theories that are grounded 
in data.  Cookie-cutter explanations that begin from a particular theoretical perspective do not 
provide much assistance because they are not designed to provide such explanations.  They are 
themselves contextualised and embedded.  They may provide us with structural and analytical 
tools but slavish adaptations and translations to different empirical instances is itself problematic.  
In part, this reflects the unique and contextually specific features of experiments in neo-
liberalism, and the enfolding of new and old ideas.141  If socio-legal studies tell us anything, it is 
that the shadow of the past remains, albeit mobile with time, so that a more sociological 
approach, attendant to specificities and counter-factual scenarios, provides an important 
corrective.   
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The corollary of our analysis is that  synchronic and comparative static institutionalist analyses  
which provide a bare, partial picture - should be rejected in favour of a diachronic approach.  A 
diachronic analysis concerns itself with the development and change of a subject over time akin 
to a ‘historical’ construction, whereas a synchronic analysis is confined to analysis of particular 
snapshot in time.  Diachronic analyses provide – certainly in this context – a more complicated 
picture through which continuities and discontinuities can be traced over time.142  Wacquant 
makes this move in his study of urban poverty, arguing that singular events (such as riots) can 
only be viewed diachronically: “to forget that urban space is a historical and political construction in 
the strong sense of the term is to risk (mis)taking for ‘neighbourhood effects’ what is nothing 
more than the spatial retranslation of economic and social differences”.143  Thus, time itself 
becomes an important object of study, one which is often left out of socio-legal analysis, as an 
important adjunct of, for example, space.144  And time here is not thought about as linear, but as 
plural and complex, so that it is mashed up.145  In our study, we find layers of uneven shapes – 
like the rings in a tree reflecting particular weather conditions, or uneven substrata – which 
demonstrate the formalisations of different common sense interventions at different moments, 
all of which coagulate into current housing allocation schemes.146   
Our final point is that political processes have been subordinated to an understanding of housing 
“crisis”, which constructs the lack of affordable social housing as requiring such interventions as 
have increased the numbers of “unhouseables” in the name of localism.  The “good news” story 
central government can now tell, about declining housing need because, as an apparent indicator 
of housing need, housing waiting lists are getting shorter.  This dominant narrative is being met 
with alternative, subaltern processes of resistance.  One of the lessons of housing politics in 2014 
was of increasing grassroots housing activism, combined with a disconnect between politicians 
and the electorate.147   
Law has provided one significant method of challenging the adoption of these criteria.  It 
represents one of the remaining mechanisms through which authoritarian interventions can be 
challenged in the housing sphere.  Law’s power remains visible.  Instinctively, this feels rather 
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odd and problematic because the judicial review process provides a method through which 
individuals can challenge a decision made on behalf of the collective, after consultation, in the 
allocation of scarce resources.148  However, law appears to be a significant mechanism for change 
- despite the existence of groups struggling against bureaucracies in high pressure areas, agitating 
for change and squatting empty properties (which are ironically evicted by the proper application 
of law).149  Further, the developing jurisprudence on this crucial issue of allocations does not 
speak with one voice and is, perhaps paradoxically, attendant to the local.150   
We have already noted the potential issues with local connection as a policy and the striking 
down of Hammersmith and Fulham LBC’s allocation scheme, which sought to exclude homeless 
households.  There must now be a very real prospect of a cascading effect of nervousness 
amongst other local authority housing teams following that decision.151 Given our findings, that 
sense of nervousness is likely to be pretty much universal.  Some long-cherished and/or overlaid 
assumptions appear to be challengeable.  Building on the Hammersmith experience, there must 
be some doubt as to at least some of the other qualification criteria if it means that households 
to which the authority is required to give reasonable preference are excluded. 
 
                                                          
148 This was a central reason for the decision in Ahmad, see for example Baroness Hale, at [11]-[13] – further, as 
Lord Neuberger put it, “…the yawning chasm between the supply of social housing, and the demand for it from 
such a large number of households with pressing needs, [means that] any scheme for allocating Newham’s housing 
could be criticised” [54]. 
149 These groups are discussed in D. Cowan and S. Wheeler, “The reach of human rights”, in J. Alian and T. Qu 
(eds), Property and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, forthcoming). 
150 Compare the Hammersmith and Epping Forest decisions. 
151 In gathering the data for this study, routinely local authorities reported their allocations policies to be under close 
review in view of the changing legal landscape. 
